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Executive Summary
For more than a century, the United States has taken the lead in organizing international 
responses to international environmental problems.  The long list of environmental 
agreements spearheaded by the United States extends from early treaties with Canada and 
Mexico on boundary waters and migratory birds to global agreements restricting trade in 
endangered species and protecting against ozone depletion.  
In the last two decades, however, U.S. environmental leadership has faltered.  The best-
known example is the lack of an effective response to climate change, underscored by 
the U.S. decision not to join the Kyoto Protocol.  But that is not the only shortfall.  The 
United States has also failed to join a large and growing number of treaties directed at other 
environmental threats, including marine pollution, the loss of biological diversity, persistent 
organic pollutants, and trade in toxic substances.  
In this paper, we urge the U.S. government to ratify ten of these treaties.  We focus on 
these agreements not only because they address important environmental problems, but also 
because they do not cause the fierce partisan debate that has unfortunately hampered U.S. 
policy toward climate change.  All ten of these agreements enjoy bipartisan support.  All 
ten have been signed by the United States:  five by Republican administrations and five 
by Democratic administrations.  
Signatures alone do not make these treaties binding.  The treaties must also be ratified, which 
generally requires that the Senate provide its advice and consent by a two-thirds vote.  In 
some cases, implementing legislation must be enacted by both houses of Congress.  It is here 
that the process has broken down.  The Executive Branch has sent each of these agreements 
to the Senate, albeit sometimes after a lengthy delay.1  But the Senate has given its advice and 
consent to only one, which nevertheless still awaits the necessary implementing legislation.  
Both the Executive Branch and Congress have contributed to this problem.  In some cases, 
presidential administrations have failed to urge prompt approval of an agreement or to 
propose implementing legislation.  In others, the Senate or Congress as a whole has failed to 
act despite encouragement from the Executive Branch.  Although the reasons for the delays 
vary from treaty to treaty, the delays are alike in their unconscionable length.  As Table 1 
shows, the United States signed eight of the treaties more than a decade ago.  A ninth treaty 
has been waiting nine years.  The average time since signature is 13 years, and the average 
time for those pending Senate approval is more than eight years.
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Why the United States Should Ratify Ten Pending Environmental Treaties
The failure of the United States to join these treaties undermines global environmental 
protection.  The treaties set out standards and create institutions designed to find and 
implement solutions to problems of critical importance.  They have attracted support from 
other countries, including our closest allies.  Indeed, several are among the most widely 
ratified treaties in history.  In every case, the regimes these treaties have established are less 
successful without U.S. membership than they could be with the full engagement of the 
country with the largest economy and the largest environmental impact.   
The failure to ratify the agreements also harms specific U.S. interests.  The treaties reflect U.S. 
proposals and positions.  By failing to join them, the United States is not taking advantage of 
the benefits for which it negotiated, including being able to make claims to the resource-rich 
continental shelf off the U.S. coast, reducing marine pollution affecting U.S. waters, ensuring 
U.S. access to foreign plant gene banks, and receiving reimbursement for the costs of 
responding to environmental emergencies in Antarctica.  The failure to join the agreements 
also prevents the United States from fully participating in their ongoing interpretation and 
implementation, which often involve issues that directly affect the United States.  More 
generally, the failure to follow signature with ratification undermines the ability of the United 
States to influence future negotiations by tarnishing its reputation as a country that delivers 
on its promises.  
If ratifying these treaties would be onerous or expensive, then the delays might be more 
understandable.  But that is not the case.  In some instances, no implementing legislation 
is needed.  In others, only minor legislative changes are necessary.  None of the agreements 
would require major changes to U.S. law.  And none would erode U.S. sovereignty.  
For all of these reasons, the Obama Administration and Congress should work expeditiously 
to clear the backlog of treaties in ratification limbo and restore the United States’ leadership 
in international efforts to protect the global environment. 
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Convention or Treaty Benefits of Ratification Bipartisan Support Actions Needed
Status
Date Signed Date Sent to Senate
Years 
Since 
Signature
Years 
Pending 
in Senate
Agreement on 
Albatrosses and Petrels
•	 Enhances U.S. efforts and leadership to promote 
international cooperation to conserve these iconic 
seabirds
•	 Enables the United States to safeguard albatross and 
petrel populations that rest, nest, and feed in U.S. 
territories and in waters beyond U.S. jurisdiction
The George W. Bush Administration signed 
the Agreement and submitted it to the 
Senate for advice and consent; the Obama 
Administration also submitted it to the 
Senate, shortly after taking office.  
The Senate needs to provide its consent to ratification, and Congress 
needs to enact implementing legislation.
06/19/2001 09/26/2008 10 3
Antarctic Liability 
Annex
•	 Provides for liability of parties responsible for causing 
environmental emergencies in Antarctica
•	 Provides for payment to party that responds to 
environmental emergencies caused by other countries 
The Clinton Administration began 
negotiation of the Liability Annex, the Bush 
Administration completed the negotiation, 
and the Obama Administration submitted 
it to the Senate. 
The Obama Administration needs to develop, and Congress should 
enact, the necessary implementing legislation, and the Senate needs 
to approve ratification.
06/14/2005 04/02/2009 6 2
Basel Convention
•	 Ensures environmentally sound management of wastes 
through final disposal
•	 Allows the United States to participate in waste 
transfers to Basel Parties without separate bilateral or 
multilateral agreements 
•	 Enables the United States to participate fully in key 
Basel decisions
The Senate gave its consent to ratification 
in 1992, and every president since George 
H.W. Bush has supported joining the 
treaty.
The Obama Administration should develop, and Congress should 
enact, implementing legislation that amends the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act to prohibit shipments of waste that 
will not be handled in an environmentally sound manner and to 
authorize the re-import of waste found to be illegally transported. 
03/22/1990
Approved 
08/11/1992
21 −
Biodiversity Convention
•	 Strengthens U.S. position to help bio-diverse regions 
conserve their natural resources
•	 Builds closer ties with other Parties to achieve a range 
of biodiversity conservation goals
In 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee recommended by a bipartisan 
vote of 16-3 that the Senate approve 
ratification.  Industry representatives such 
as the American Seed Trade Association 
submitted letters in support of ratification.  
The Senate needs to approve ratification.  No implementing 
legislation is necessary.  
06/04/1993 11/20/1993 18 18
London Dumping 
Convention, 1996 
Protocol
•	 Enhances protection of the marine environment
•	 Provides a framework for technical assistance to aid 
marine environmental protection
•	 Enables participation in forums to address scientific 
issues related to ocean dumping and to settle disputes 
arising from ocean-dumping activities
The George W. Bush Administration 
strongly supported ratification, and in 
July 2008 the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee approved ratification of the 
Protocol on a voice vote without objection. 
The Senate should give its consent to ratification, and Congress 
should enact implementing legislation, such as the proposed changes 
to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act that were 
submitted by the George W. Bush Administration.
03/31/1998 09/04/2007 13 4
Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources
•	 Enables participation in the interpretation and 
implementation of Treaty
•	 Establishes a firm legal basis for international access to 
plant genetic materials
The George W. Bush Administration signed 
the treaty and submitted it to the Senate, 
and the Obama Administration has urged 
the Senate to approve it, as have major 
U.S. stakeholders such as the American 
Seed Trade Association, the National 
Farmers Union, and the Intellectual 
Property Owners of America.  
The Senate needs to give its approval to ratification.  No 
implementing legislation is necessary.
11/03/2002 07/07/2008 9 3
1998 POPs Protocol to 
LRTAP
•	 Reduces exposure of U.S. citizens to toxic chemicals
•	 Allows the U.S. to influence the future of the global 
chemicals regime
The Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama 
Administrations have all supported 
these agreements.  They have also 
received extensive support from industry 
organizations such as the American 
Chemistry Council and non-governmental 
organizations.
The Senate needs to approve the Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions, and Congress needs to amend the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
to implement the agreements.  
06/24/1998 − 13 −
Rotterdam Convention 
on PIC
09/11/1998 02/09/2000 13 11
Stockholm Convention 
on POPs
05/23/2001 05/06/2002 10 9
U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea
•	 Protects U.S. security interests on the high seas as the 
world’s largest maritime power
•	 Protects U.S. interests in vital economic and 
environmental interests, such as migratory fish stocks 
and ocean pollution
•	 Allows U.S. to participate in key decisions about the 
Convention relating to, for example, the freedom of 
navigation, marine environmental protection, natural 
resources extraction, and scientific marine research
•	 Allows U.S. to participate in process for territorial 
claims over marine resources, including claims over the 
continental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone
The Convention has received strong 
support from the Clinton, George W. Bush, 
and Obama Administrations.  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has twice 
reported it favorably by overwhelming 
bipartisan majorities.  The U.S. security 
leadership has unequivocally voiced 
support for the convention, as have ocean 
policy experts, the oil and gas industry, 
and environmental groups. 
The Senate needs to approve ratification.   07/29/1994 10/07/1994 17 17
Table 1.  Summary of Pending International Environmental Treaties.
Convention or Treaty Benefits of Ratification Bipartisan Support Actions Needed
Status
Date Signed Date Sent to Senate
Years 
Since 
Signature
Years 
Pending 
in Senate
Agreement on 
Albatrosses and Petrels
•	 Enhances U.S. efforts and leadership to promote 
international cooperation to conserve these iconic 
seabirds
•	 Enables the United States to safeguard albatross and 
petrel populations that rest, nest, and feed in U.S. 
territories and in waters beyond U.S. jurisdiction
The George W. Bush Administration signed 
the Agreement and submitted it to the 
Senate for advice and consent; the Obama 
Administration also submitted it to the 
Senate, shortly after taking office.  
The Senate needs to provide its consent to ratification, and Congress 
needs to enact implementing legislation.
06/19/2001 09/26/2008 10 3
Antarctic Liability 
Annex
•	 Provides for liability of parties responsible for causing 
environmental emergencies in Antarctica
•	 Provides for payment to party that responds to 
environmental emergencies caused by other countries 
The Clinton Administration began 
negotiation of the Liability Annex, the Bush 
Administration completed the negotiation, 
and the Obama Administration submitted 
it to the Senate. 
The Obama Administration needs to develop, and Congress should 
enact, the necessary implementing legislation, and the Senate needs 
to approve ratification.
06/14/2005 04/02/2009 6 2
Basel Convention
•	 Ensures environmentally sound management of wastes 
through final disposal
•	 Allows the United States to participate in waste 
transfers to Basel Parties without separate bilateral or 
multilateral agreements 
•	 Enables the United States to participate fully in key 
Basel decisions
The Senate gave its consent to ratification 
in 1992, and every president since George 
H.W. Bush has supported joining the 
treaty.
The Obama Administration should develop, and Congress should 
enact, implementing legislation that amends the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act to prohibit shipments of waste that 
will not be handled in an environmentally sound manner and to 
authorize the re-import of waste found to be illegally transported. 
03/22/1990
Approved 
08/11/1992
21 −
Biodiversity Convention
•	 Strengthens U.S. position to help bio-diverse regions 
conserve their natural resources
•	 Builds closer ties with other Parties to achieve a range 
of biodiversity conservation goals
In 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee recommended by a bipartisan 
vote of 16-3 that the Senate approve 
ratification.  Industry representatives such 
as the American Seed Trade Association 
submitted letters in support of ratification.  
The Senate needs to approve ratification.  No implementing 
legislation is necessary.  
06/04/1993 11/20/1993 18 18
London Dumping 
Convention, 1996 
Protocol
•	 Enhances protection of the marine environment
•	 Provides a framework for technical assistance to aid 
marine environmental protection
•	 Enables participation in forums to address scientific 
issues related to ocean dumping and to settle disputes 
arising from ocean-dumping activities
The George W. Bush Administration 
strongly supported ratification, and in 
July 2008 the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee approved ratification of the 
Protocol on a voice vote without objection. 
The Senate should give its consent to ratification, and Congress 
should enact implementing legislation, such as the proposed changes 
to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act that were 
submitted by the George W. Bush Administration.
03/31/1998 09/04/2007 13 4
Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources
•	 Enables participation in the interpretation and 
implementation of Treaty
•	 Establishes a firm legal basis for international access to 
plant genetic materials
The George W. Bush Administration signed 
the treaty and submitted it to the Senate, 
and the Obama Administration has urged 
the Senate to approve it, as have major 
U.S. stakeholders such as the American 
Seed Trade Association, the National 
Farmers Union, and the Intellectual 
Property Owners of America.  
The Senate needs to give its approval to ratification.  No 
implementing legislation is necessary.
11/03/2002 07/07/2008 9 3
1998 POPs Protocol to 
LRTAP
•	 Reduces exposure of U.S. citizens to toxic chemicals
•	 Allows the U.S. to influence the future of the global 
chemicals regime
The Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama 
Administrations have all supported 
these agreements.  They have also 
received extensive support from industry 
organizations such as the American 
Chemistry Council and non-governmental 
organizations.
The Senate needs to approve the Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions, and Congress needs to amend the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
to implement the agreements.  
06/24/1998 − 13 −
Rotterdam Convention 
on PIC
09/11/1998 02/09/2000 13 11
Stockholm Convention 
on POPs
05/23/2001 05/06/2002 10 9
U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea
•	 Protects U.S. security interests on the high seas as the 
world’s largest maritime power
•	 Protects U.S. interests in vital economic and 
environmental interests, such as migratory fish stocks 
and ocean pollution
•	 Allows U.S. to participate in key decisions about the 
Convention relating to, for example, the freedom of 
navigation, marine environmental protection, natural 
resources extraction, and scientific marine research
•	 Allows U.S. to participate in process for territorial 
claims over marine resources, including claims over the 
continental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone
The Convention has received strong 
support from the Clinton, George W. Bush, 
and Obama Administrations.  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has twice 
reported it favorably by overwhelming 
bipartisan majorities.  The U.S. security 
leadership has unequivocally voiced 
support for the convention, as have ocean 
policy experts, the oil and gas industry, 
and environmental groups. 
The Senate needs to approve ratification.   07/29/1994 10/07/1994 17 17
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I. Agreement on Albatrosses and Petrels
Agreement on the ConservAtion of AlbAtrosses And Petrels 
Adopted and Opened for Signature on June 19, 2001
Entered into Force on February 1, 2004 
Number of Parties: 13 
Signed by the United States, June 19, 2001 
Sent to the Senate, September 26, 2008, and January 16, 2009
What Is the Environmental Problem?
Albatrosses and petrels are oceanic birds with a unique natural history that makes them 
particularly vulnerable to changes in the marine environment.  The species covered by the 
Agreement typically breed on remote, barren islands and spend most of their time flying long 
distances over the ocean.  Some species may not return to land for many years after their 
birth, and then only to reproduce.
Many species of albatrosses and petrels are now threatened or endangered because  
of significant changes in their environment.  For some, the major threats come from 
industrial fishing practices that can decimate sea bird populations.  An estimated 300,000 
seabirds are killed each year as by-catch in the long-line fishing industry.2  Marine pollution, 
particularly plastics that can be ingested by sea birds, is also reducing populations.  
Albatrosses and petrels are magnificent fliers but are awkward and vulnerable on land.   
Loss of nesting habitat, introduction of non-native invasive predators, hunting and egg 
harvesting, and contamination by lead and other toxins have reduced breeding success  
on many key nesting grounds.3  
Effective conservation of albatrosses and petrels requires international cooperation.  
Their highly migratory natural history means that they spend little time in any single 
country’s territory, apart from the breeding season.  Many of the threats to their survival  
take place in international waters (for example, due to off-shore fishing operations)  
and require international standards for their protection.  International cooperation is also 
necessary for generating the political will, public awareness, and financial resources necessary 
for the protection of vulnerable island and coastal breeding areas. 
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How Does the Agreement Address This Problem?
The Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels aims to enhance international 
cooperation for these vulnerable species.  The Agreement’s objective is to achieve and 
maintain a “favourable conservation status for albatrosses and petrels.”4  The Agreement 
currently covers all 22 of the world’s species of albatrosses and seven species of petrels.   
The Agreement enumerates a wide range of conservation measures in the body of the 
Agreement and in an Action Plan included as Annex 2.  Parties commit to take measures, 
among others, to: 
•	 conserve and restore habitat; 
•	 eliminate or control non-native species; 
•	 prohibit the deliberate taking of, or harmful 
interference with, the birds, their eggs, or their 
breeding sites;  
•	 prohibit the use of, or trade in, albatrosses and 
petrels; and 
•	 reduce or prevent incidental mortality from 
commercial fishing operations.    
The Agreement also calls for increased capacity 
building, exchange of scientific information, and efforts 
to increase public awareness of the threats to albatrosses 
and petrels.  The Agreement establishes a separate 
Secretariat and a periodic meeting of the Parties.
What Is the History and Status of the Agreement?
The United States initially indicated that it would not be party to the Agreement  
and pressured the Parties to exclude the three species of albatrosses that most commonly 
occur in U.S. territory from the original Agreement.  In 2009, the Agreement was 
extended to these albatross species, apparently reflecting a change in the George W. Bush 
Administration’s opposition to the Agreement.  Subsequently, both the George W. Bush  
and Obama Administrations have submitted the Agreement to the Senate for its advice  
and consent to ratification.  
Together with the Agreement, the Bush Administration submitted the Albatross and Petrel 
Conservation Act, which was intended to implement the Agreement and mirrors much of its 
language.5  The Act would provide the Departments of Interior and Commerce the authority 
to adopt and implement conservation and management measures for protecting albatross and 
petrel species.  The Act would prohibit the deliberate taking of albatrosses and petrels and 
protect their breeding habitat.6  While killing albatrosses and petrels as the result of by-catch 
from otherwise legal fishing activities is explicitly not prohibited, the Act aims to minimize 
such by-catch.7
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Why Should the United States Ratify the Agreement?
Ratifying the treaty would enhance U.S. efforts to promote international cooperation in 
conserving these iconic seabirds.  Some of the target species breed in U.S. territory but forage 
throughout the world, well beyond U.S. jurisdiction or control, and effective conservation is 
impossible without the cooperation of other fishing and coastal states.  Ratification, coupled 
with enacting implementing legislation, would allow the United States to safeguard albatross 
and petrel populations that rest, nest, and feed in the United States and its territories and in 
waters over which the United States has no jurisdiction.8  As a Party, the United States could 
take a greater leadership role in encouraging, facilitating, and pressuring other Parties to 
conserve seabirds outside U.S. territories.
Ratification of the Agreement would require minimal substantive changes to U.S. law.   
At the federal level, albatrosses and petrels are already protected by the Endangered Species 
Act,9 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,10 and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation  
and Management Act.11  Together, these existing statutes already reflect most of the 
obligations included in the Agreement.  The Agreement and implementing Act would help  
to consolidate and highlight the protections currently afforded by U.S. law but would 
add few substantive requirements.12  In particular, no new restrictions would be placed 
on otherwise legal fishing activities.  As a result, little political opposition exists to the 
Agreement’s ratification.   
Commercial fishermen, the most likely opponents of ratification, may actually benefit from 
its ratification.  The Agreement furthers international standards on the bycatch of seabirds 
from fishing operations that could help to level the playing field for U.S. fishermen.13  Under 
existing domestic law, they are already subject to most of the restrictions required under 
the Agreement, but they are at a competitive disadvantage compared to fishermen from 
countries with weaker seabird conservation laws.  Participation in the Agreement would help 
the United States support the development and implementation of stronger conservation 
measures in other fishing fleets.  Endorsing the Agreement would also better position the 
United States as a leader in the global policy dialogue on sustainable fishing practices, both 
with respect to the conservation of seabirds and more generally.
What Actions Should the United States Take?
The Agreement is the latest in a long line of treaties aimed at the conservation of marine 
species that require international cooperation for their survival.  Whales,14 fur seals,15 tuna,16 
migratory fish stocks,17 and sea turtles18 all enjoy the protection of international agreements.  
The United States is a party to all of these agreements, and we should continue our  
leadership for the conservation of marine wildlife by swiftly ratifying the Agreement for  
the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels.
The Agreement 
is the latest 
in a long line 
of treaties 
aimed at the 
conservation of 
marine species 
that require 
international 
cooperation for 
their survival.
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II. Antarctic Liability Annex
Annex vi on liAbility Arising from environmentAl emergenCies  
to the ProtoCol on environmentAl ProteCtion to the AntArCtiC treAty 
Adopted and Opened for Signature on June 14, 2005 
Entry into Force Pending
Signed by the United States on June 14, 2005 
Sent to the Senate on April 2, 2009  
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
The Antarctic environment is unique in many ways.  Antarctica is the coldest, driest, 
highest, most pristine, and least inhabited continent.  Together with the Southern Ocean 
that surrounds it, Antarctica has the largest contained ecosystem on the planet.  Home to 
whales, seals, penguins, petrels, and many animals and plants found nowhere else on earth, 
Antarctica also plays an integral role in regulating global environmental processes.  Its vast ice 
fields cool the entire planet by acting as a giant reflector of the sun’s rays.     
Although the Antarctic environment is isolated from most human contact, it is still 
vulnerable to degradation from human activities.  Some sources of harm are far from 
Antarctica, such as emissions of greenhouse gases that are rapidly warming the polar regions 
and emissions of chemicals that have caused a “hole” in the ozone layer over the southern 
pole.  But many threats to the Antarctic environment arise locally from scientific and 
commercial activities there.      
The United States and other countries have long recognized that Antarctica provides 
unmatched opportunities for scientific research into issues of global importance.  For 
example, by studying the record of changing climatic conditions preserved in ice layers, 
scientists work to determine the magnitude of modern global warming.  Of the 40 scientific 
stations on the continent, the United States operates three, including one at the South Pole.  
The population at the bases fluctuates between about 1,000 in the austral winter and 4,500 
in the summer.  More than a quarter of these hardy souls are at U.S. stations.  
Commercially, the most important activities are fishing and tourism.  Fishing vessels 
continue to come to the Southern Ocean as they have for many decades, and tourism is the 
fastest-growing industry in Antarctica.  The first tours to Antarctica in the 1970s brought 
only a few hundred visitors annually.  Today, the number has risen to nearly 50,000 visitors 
every year.19  Although most tour operators comply with international guidelines designed 
to prevent environmental harm, the growing number of tourists increases the likelihood of 
accidents.  In recent years, several ships have run aground, leaking fuel oil into the ocean.  
In 2007, a cruise ship flying a Liberian flag of convenience was punctured by ice and sank.  
Although its passengers and crew were evacuated unharmed, its fuel and other debris were 
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released into the environment.  Fortunately, these recent incidents have been relatively minor, 
but larger accidents have occurred in the past.  In 1989, an Argentinean ship ran aground 
near a U.S. station, spilling 250,000 gallons of fuel oil.  
How Does the Annex Address the Problem?
Protection of the Antarctic environment is complicated not only by its isolation and extreme 
weather conditions but also by the absence of a single government with jurisdiction over the 
entire continent.  Seven countries have made territorial claims to parts of Antarctica, but the 
United States and most other countries do not recognize their claims.  Despite disagreements 
over jurisdiction, the United States and other nations with scientific interests in Antarctica 
have worked together to establish rules governing conduct on the continent.  In the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty, the Parties agreed on basic principles, including freedom of scientific inquiry 
and a prohibition on military activity,20 and in subsequent agreements they set out rules for 
environmental protection.  
The most important of these agreements is the Madrid Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1998.21  The Protocol and its 
five annexes prohibit mining and establish detailed requirements concerning environmental 
impact assessment, protection of native plants and animals, disposal of waste, and prevention 
of marine pollution.  The Protocol recognizes that accidents may occur despite these 
protections, and it requires the Parties to provide for “prompt and effective response action” 
to any environmental emergencies.22  However, it does not allocate liability for environmental 
harm.  Instead, the Protocol commits the Parties to negotiate rules governing such liability.23  
To that end, in 2005 the Parties agreed on the Liability Annex to the Protocol.24  Under  
the Annex, if the operator of an activity in Antarctica fails to take prompt and effective 
response action to an environmental emergency,25 it will be liable to pay the costs of the 
response action taken or authorized by the state Parties.  If no response action is taken at all, 
then the operator must pay the costs of the action that should have been taken.26  To ensure 
that payment can be made, the Annex requires that operators take out the necessary level of 
insurance on their actions.  Payment is made into an international fund that is administered 
by the Parties, from which reimbursement may be made for response actions taken by Parties 
that did not cause the emergency.27  
What Is the History and Status of the Annex? 
There is a long history of bipartisanship on Antarctica, particularly with respect to liability 
for environmental harm.  The Madrid Protocol was negotiated, signed, and submitted to 
the Senate by the George H.W. Bush Administration.  The Clinton Administration worked 
with Congress to draft implementing legislation for the Madrid Protocol and began the 
negotiation of the Liability Annex.  The George W. Bush Administration completed the 
negotiation of the Annex in 2005, and the Obama Administration sent the Annex to the 
Senate for its advice and consent in 2009.
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Why Should the United States 
Ratify the Annex?
The Liability Annex directly furthers U.S. 
interests in Antarctica.  With the largest 
scientific presence in Antarctica, as well as 
the greatest number of tourists who travel 
there to view its pristine beauty, the United 
States has strong interests in preserving the 
Antarctic environment.  The United States 
greatly influenced the negotiation of the 
Annex, convincing other countries to focus 
on environmental emergencies, which give 
rise to the most urgent need for response.  
By requiring operators to pay the costs of 
response actions, the Liability Annex will 
provide them with strong incentives to take 
care to avoid environmental harm and will 
reimburse innocent Parties that respond to 
emergencies caused by others.   
The United States is much more likely to receive compensation under this system than to 
make a payment.  Although the United States has a large presence in Antarctica, its tourists 
and scientists are fewer than those from other countries combined.  Moreover, the U.S. 
government already carefully regulates activities within its bases and on ships under its 
jurisdiction.  Because it cannot control all activities that might affect its bases and ships, 
however, the United States may be put in the position of having to respond to environmental 
emergencies caused by activities under the nominal jurisdiction of other countries.  Without 
a system of compensation in place, the U.S. government would have to take such actions 
without any certainty that its expenses would be reimbursed by the responsible Parties.  The 
legislation necessary to implement U.S. obligations under the Annex with respect to activities 
under its jurisdiction would involve no major changes to U.S. law and would not raise 
partisan issues.  
What Actions Should the United States Take?
The Liability Annex will not enter into force until all of the 28 consultative Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty ratify it.  Ratification by the United States will enable it to urge other 
countries to ratify as well, allowing the treaty to take effect as soon as possible.  The Senate 
should act quickly to provide its advice and consent, and the Obama Administration and 
Congress should develop and enact the necessary implementing legislation.  
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III. Basel Convention
bAsel Convention on the Control of trAnsboundAry movement 
of hAzArdous WAstes And their disPosAl 
Adopted and Opened for Signature on March 22, 1989
Entered into Force on May 5, 1992 
Number of Parties: 178
Signed by the United States, March 22, 1990 
Sent to the Senate, May 17, 1991 
Approved by the Senate, August 11, 1992
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
Today, the transboundary waste trade is global in scope and a multi-billion dollar industry.  
It includes trade among wealthy countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and trade between other rich and poor countries around the 
world.  The trade includes cargo destined for final disposal, as well as a wide variety of 
recycling and resource recovery operations.  The waste trade involves highly toxic materials, 
such as pesticide residues, used solvents, and process wastes from manufacturing.  The fastest 
growing part of the trade is electronic waste (such as laptops, cellphones, and televisions), 
which contain lead, mercury, and other toxic components.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, wealthy nations including the United States began to tighten their 
hazardous waste disposal regulations, increasing the incentive for waste generators to find 
low-cost disposal options abroad.  The 1980s saw several waste dumping incidents that 
were heavily covered in the media, such as the infamous voyage of the Khian Sea.  Before 
being detected by Haitian authorities, the Khian Sea fraudulently dumped 4,000 tons 
of incinerator ash in Haiti that had been generated in Philadelphia.  The Khian Sea then 
wandered the high seas for 18 months seeking a place to dispose of the remainder of its toxic 
cargo and is widely believed to have dumped it at sea.28    
How Does the Convention Address This Problem?
The transboundary waste trade is primarily conducted by private firms, and the 1989 Basel 
Convention was designed to add a layer of international control to these private, and often 
secretive, transactions.  The Convention was a response to international outrage over the 
cross-boundary trade of hazardous waste, particularly export of waste from rich, developed 
nations to poor, developing nations.  
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The Basel Convention does not ban the waste trade.  Instead, it attempts to manage the trade 
through a system of prior informed consent.  The exporting state must obtain the consent 
of the importing state for the waste shipment, and it must comply with procedures designed 
to ensure safe transport and environmentally sound management in the location of final 
disposal.29   The Convention also mandates that the exporting nation re-import hazardous 
waste where it becomes clear that final disposal cannot be completed in accordance with the 
disposal contract.30  The Convention criminalizes illegal transportation of hazardous wastes, 
and each party is responsible for enacting national legislation to prevent and punish illegal 
traffic in hazardous waste.31
What Is the History and Status of the Convention? 
The United States was actively involved in the negotiation of the Convention and signed 
the treaty in 1990.  The U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification in 1992, and every U.S. 
President since George H.W. Bush has supported joining the treaty.  Today, 178 countries 
are Parties to the Convention, making it one of the most widely ratified treaties in the world.  
Afghanistan, Haiti, and the United States are the only countries that have signed but have 
not ratified the Convention.   
Although the U.S. Senate approved ratification nearly 20 years ago, the State Department 
cannot officially deposit the U.S. instrument of ratification until Congress passes 
implementing legislation.  In particular, Congress must enact legislation restricting  
the import and export of hazardous waste as set forth by the Basel Convention, through 
amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”),  
discussed below.  
Why Should the United States Ratify the Convention?
The Basel Convention is clearly in the interests of the United States.  It is appropriate for 
U.S. waste exporters to obtain the consent of the receiving country for a broader range of 
wastes than only the hazardous wastes currently regulated under RCRA.  Moreover, the 
Convention’s requirement to ensure environmentally sound management of wastes through 
final disposal is a helpful counterbalance to the see-no-evil standard of current law, under 
which waste generators have no continuing responsibility once waste leaves U.S. shores.
Today,  
178 countries 
are Parties to 
the Convention, 
making it one 
of the most 
widely ratified 
treaties  
in the world. 
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In the 1990s, both the George H.W. Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration 
strongly supported accession to the Basel Convention.  When President George H.W. Bush 
transmitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in 1991  
he noted that ratification had received the unanimous recommendation of interested 
agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, 
the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the 
Interior.  “The notice-and-consent regime it establishes advances environmental goals that 
the United States has long held,” President Bush wrote.  “We were one of the first nations 
to enact legislation prohibiting exports of hazardous wastes without the consent of the 
importing country.”32  In addition, an accompanying memo from Deputy Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger explained that: 
[E]xpeditious ratification is in the interest of the United States. Once the Convention 
enters into force, the United States, if not yet a party, will be barred from exporting 
wastes to or importing wastes from Parties, unless it has a bilateral or regional agreement 
meeting the standards of Article 11 with a party. Delays in ratification could therefore 
disrupt U.S. trade in the materials covered by the Convention, a possibility of special 
concern to processors and consumers of recyclable materials. In addition, ratification  
is the only way to ensure that the United States may participate fully in the conference  
of the Parties, which will decide issues of importance to the United States, such 
as financial obligations, state responsibility and liability, and the definition of 
environmentally sound management.33
Opposition came from some industry groups, such as the Business Recycling Coalition, 
which were concerned about how hazardous wastes were defined under the Convention and 
about how U.S. implementing legislation would distinguish between waste and reusable 
materials.34  Some environmental groups also opposed the Convention because they viewed 
it as legitimizing the hazardous waste trade.  From their perspective, the United States 
should only accede to the Convention if it also ratifies a subsequent 1995 amendment to 
the Convention, commonly known as the Basel Ban Amendment.35  This Amendment 
implements a total ban on waste shipments from wealthy countries36 to developing countries 
in an effort to counteract corruption and lax oversight in this field.  However, the Basel 
Ban Amendment is a fundamentally distinct ratification issue from the underlying Basel 
Convention, and the United States could choose to be party to the Basel Convention without 
choosing to be party to the Basel Ban Amendment.  Moreover, the Basel Ban Amendment 
has not yet entered into force and should not prevent consideration of the underlying treaty.  
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The failure to ratify the Basel Convention prevents the United States from 
participating in waste transfers with Basel Parties unless it enters into separate 
bilateral or multilateral agreements with them.  Over the past three decades, 
the United States has cobbled together several such agreements, allowing for 
imports and exports of hazardous waste with Canada and Mexico, exchanges 
of wastes only for recycling with OECD countries, and imports of waste from 
Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  However, negotiating these ad hoc 
bilateral agreements is a cumbersome process, and the United States remains 
isolated from decision-making under the Convention.
As discussed above, Congress would also have to amend RCRA in order for 
the Convention to take effect.  The needed changes include creating authority 
to prohibit shipments when the United States has reason to believe that the 
wastes will not be handled in an environmentally sound manner, as well as 
the authority to take charge of wastes found to be illegally transported (the 
Convention’s re-import requirement).  Under current law, RCRA requires 
consent of the receiving country for exports of hazardous waste, but the 
statute does not require assurances of environmentally sound disposal.  In 
addition, while current law controls exports of RCRA-regulated hazardous 
wastes, the Basel Convention is broader in that it also governs movements 
of household wastes, ash from garbage incinerators, and wastes defined as 
hazardous under the Convention but not under U.S. law.37   
What Actions Should the United States Take?
By not joining the Convention, the United States has missed opportunities to participate 
fully in key Basel decisions such as the Basel Ban Amendment, control of electronic wastes, 
and liability rules for environmental damage from hazardous waste.  Moreover, U.S. firms 
that operate in countries that are Parties to the Basel Convention are already subject to 
Basel Convention rules.  Because the United States is a non-Party, these firms are also 
highly restricted in sending wastes back to the United States, even to their own parent or 
sister companies and even for recycling.  The barriers to joining the treaty are minimal and 
surmountable, and the Obama Administration and Congress should move quickly to draft 
and pass the necessary amendments to RCRA.
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IV. Biodiversity Convention
Convention on biologiCAl diversity 
Adopted and Opened for Signature on June 5, 1992
Entered into Force on December 29, 1993 
Number of Parties: 193
Signed by the United States on June 4, 1993 
Sent to the Senate on November 20, 1993 
Reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
on June 29, 1994
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
Biological diversity (or biodiversity) is “the variability among living organisms from 
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, 
between species and ecosystems.”38  Biodiversity sustains all life processes on the planet—
the “evolutionary variation of life, built up over the several billion years of the planet’s 
existence—at the genetic, species, and ecosystem levels.”39  Biodiversity has intrinsic as well as 
aesthetic, cultural, and spiritual values.40  The economic benefits of biodiversity are significant 
as well.  Economists estimate that humans derive trillions of dollars’ worth of ecosystem 
services from viable populations of plant and animal species, clean water and air, productive 
soils, functioning wetlands, and recreational opportunities.41  
The loss of biodiversity has disastrous consequences.  Famine is one of the most immediate: 
farmers lose their pastures and croplands to invasive plant species; fruit and nut orchards lose 
their harvests due to a lack of wild pollinators; and game species and fisheries collapse from 
overharvesting or pollution.  Famine not only leads to death and disease, it also contributes 
to unrest and political instability.  According to U.S. military experts, “Anthropogenically 
generated changes to the Earth’s climate and natural environment pose a ‘serious threat to 
America’s national security.’”42 
Existing biodiversity conservation strategies are becoming less effective under the mounting 
pressure of climate change.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found 
that, in the foreseeable future, many types of ecosystems are likely to be significantly altered 
or destroyed by the combination of global warming and conventional threats such as habitat 
destruction and pollution.43  In the past 50 years, humans have altered ecosystems more 
quickly and more extensively than in any comparable period in history.44  These physical 
changes have dire consequences for plant and animal species.  According to the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, “we are losing wild species . . . faster than in any geologic period since 
the dinosaur die-off 65 million years ago.”45  
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Absent dramatic steps to mitigate climate change, one-third of the world’s plants and 
animals could be committed to extinction by 2050.46  Species at grave risk include the polar 
bear, arctic fox, pika, checkerspot butterfly, and many types of corals.47  Cold water fish 
species, amphibians, and certain kinds of birds are also highly vulnerable.  According to the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s “Red List,” the most comprehensive, 
objective assessment of the status of species 
worldwide, one in eight bird species is trending 
toward extinction.48  Changing climate can 
cause birds to mistime their migrations, putting 
them at higher risk from heat, cold, storms, and 
droughts and putting them out of sync with the 
flowers, seeds, and insects they rely upon.49  As 
for non-migratory wildlife and plant species, 
their ranges can be expected to move poleward or 
upward in elevation, even though the conditions 
in the new location may not be suitable for the 
species’ survival.50  A 2011 study published in 
Science found that species are moving in response 
to global warming up to three times faster than 
anticipated.51  
With the loss of species comes the loss of ecosystem services.  At present, 60 percent of 
ecosystem services are being degraded or over-exploited, and the situation “could grow 
significantly worse during the first half of this century.”52  To combat the loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services, the comprehensive Millennium Ecosystem Assessment recommended 
“significant changes in policies, institutions, and practices.”53  It is no longer enough to 
adopt and implement conservation strategies at the local or domestic level.  International 
partnerships are essential.
How Does the Convention Address This Problem?
The United States has demonstrated its commitment to global biodiversity conservation  
for nearly a century.  The 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, one  
of the earliest international agreements for the conservation of species, was spearheaded  
by the United States to protect birds migrating between the United States and Canada.54   
By the mid-1980s, the need for broad international cooperation to safeguard the biodiversity 
of all animal and plant species and their habitats had become apparent.  The United States 
led the effort to get the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) off the ground and into 
the diplomatic arena.  For nearly a decade, the United States continued to work in support  
of the CBD through several different administrations of both political Parties.55  
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As the CBD developed, three primary objectives emerged: 
1. the conservation of biodiversity (reflected in Articles 6-9, 11, and 14);
2. the sustainable use of biodiversity (reflected in Articles 6, 10, and 14), defined in Article 
2 as “the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not 
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to 
meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations”; and
3. the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of biological and 
genetic resources (reflected in Articles 14, 15, 16, and 19-21).56
The CBD strives to meet these goals by having Parties integrate conservation and sustainable 
use into their decision-making processes to avoid or at least minimize adverse impacts to 
biodiversity.  Parties retain discretion in determining how to do this, and the CBD explicitly 
provides that they should use “customary and local efforts as appropriate.”57
What Is the History and Status of the Convention? 
The CBD was opened for signature at the 1992 Conference on Environment and 
Development, in Rio de Janeiro.  The United States signed the treaty in June 1993, and it 
was sent to the Senate for its advice and consent in November 1993.  Although the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee recommended Senate approval of ratification by a bipartisan 
vote of 16-3, the full Senate never acted on the CBD.58  
Why Should the United States Ratify the 
Convention?
Today, the CBD has over 190 members, including almost every 
country in the world.  The United States is one of only three 
countries that does not belong,59 and the only one to sign the 
treaty but not ratify it.  The Secretary General of the United 
Nations identified the CBD as one of 25 core treaties “most 
central to the spirit and goals of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”60  The United States belongs to about half of the core 
treaties, most of which relate to warfare and human rights, but it 
has ratified only one that addresses environmental degradation:  
the Convention to Combat Desertification.61
The reasons why the United States chose to ratify the Desertification Convention apply 
equally well to the CBD.  Similar to the CBD, the Desertification Convention requires no 
new laws to be enacted and imposes no new land use restrictions in the United States.62  
According to the Congressional Research Service, the substantive benefits of a successful 
international effort to reduce desertification include reducing “the levels of emergency relief, 
civil conflicts, and migration of refugees.”63  The same can be said of the CBD.64   
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The procedural benefits of ratifying the Desertification Convention are also quite similar to 
those that would be seen if the United States were to ratify the CBD:  
[A] demonstrated U.S. commitment to ending desertification [and, in the case  
of the CBD, protecting biodiversity], strengthened partnerships with affected countries,  
and enhanced participation of others. Because the United States would be accorded full 
powers at COP sessions, it might have more influence on policy development. . . .  
[R]atification could stimulate cooperation on technical issues, create opportunities 
abroad for U.S. experts and industries involved in dryland [and, in the case of the CBD, 
biodiversity] issues, and allow U.S. experts to participate in the work of the COP.65 
Importantly, for U.S. ratification purposes, the CBD’s legal power is inherently limited.  
First, because the CBD is a “framework” convention, all decisions are made by consensus.   
As a result, Parties are not required to agree to anything they believe would be detrimental  
to national interests.  In addition, Article 3 of the CBD explicitly recognizes state sovereignty 
over domestic biological resources:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.66
Similarly, Article 15.1 guarantees the authority of each Party over their genetic resources: 
“Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to 
determine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments.”67
If the United States were to ratify the CBD, it would be much more likely to enjoy 
substantial benefits than to suffer any disadvantages.  Ratification would provide the impetus 
for the United States to better organize its biodiversity-related programs, yet it would 
require no new federal laws.68  The United States would also be in a better position to help 
strengthen the laws and policies of biodiverse regions outside the United States, many of 
which are situated in strategically important locations.  The United States would also have 
a seat at the table for negotiations at upcoming Conferences of the Parties.  Another benefit 
would be closer ties to other Parties for engagement in biodiversity-related research, as well 
as protection of the marine environment and Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems, controlling 
invasive species, mitigating and adapting to climate change, and coordinating enforcement 
efforts against biopiracy, poaching, and illegal habitat destruction. 
In the past, opponents to U.S. membership have expressed four concerns, all of which  
are easily addressed.  First, they have argued that ratification will result in “locking up” 
land from economic development.  But the CBD has no such provisions.  Land use would 
continue to be governed by domestic law, including private contracts and local and state  
land use provisions.69  There would be no changes to private property rights as a result  
of CBD ratification.70
Page 20 Center for Progressive Reform
Reclaiming Global Environmental Leadership
Second, opponents have expressed concerns that ratification would place the United States 
at a financial disadvantage.  But ratification is far more likely to produce the opposite 
effect.  While Article 20(2) of the CBD provides for “new and additional financial resources 
to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them,” 
U.S. participation in the Global Environment Facility limits potential costs to the United 
States.  As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted in recommending ratification, 
“The United States will meet its financial obligation under the [CBD] through voluntary 
contribution to the Global Environment Facility.  The amount of the contribution will be 
determined through negotiations in which the United States has an effective veto over funding 
levels that it deems excessive.”71
Third, opponents have worried that the CBD would fail to protect intellectual property 
rights.  In reality, the CBD would further U.S. interests in intellectual property rights and, 
more generally, sustainable economic development.  Article 16 of the CBD specifies that 
technology transfer shall be provided only as consistent with the intellectual property rights 
of developed countries.72  In its 1994 letter to the Senate Committee, the American Seed 
Trade Association, which bills itself as having over a century of experience “in all matters 
concerning the development, marketing and movement of seed, associated products and 
services throughout the world,” expressed its “fundamental support for ratification of this 
important intellectual property rights document.”73  To avoid any possible confusion, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that the Senate should give its advice and consent 
subject to formal understandings that the treaty’s provision on transfer of technology refers 
only to voluntary transfer, and that the Parties must ensure that any such transfer “recognizes 
and is consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.”74  
Other countries, including those in the European Union, agree that the CBD does not 
abrogate intellectual property rights.  
Fourth, opponents have suggested that research and development opportunities in other 
countries could be inhibited.  Here, too, the critics are mistaken.  Since its creation, ensuring 
access and benefit sharing (ABS) for biodiversity research and development has been one 
of the primary goals of the CBD.  As it does on other issues, the agreement respects the 
sovereignty of its members.  Article 15(1) recognizes “the sovereign rights of States over 
their natural resources,” and provides that “the authority to determine access to genetic 
resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation.”  While 
each Party is required to “endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic 
resources for environmentally sound uses by other” Parties, where granted access “shall be on 
mutually agreed terms” and subject to the prior informed consent of the Party providing the 
resources.75  The CBD encourages the benefits from use of genetic resources to be shared in 
a “fair and equitable way,” but again it leaves the terms to be worked out voluntarily between 
the companies and countries directly involved.  
As Pulitzer 
Prize-winning 
biologist 
E.O. Wilson 
said, “Useful 
products 
cannot be 
harvested 
from extinct 
species.”  
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With the largest global presence in biotechnology research, the United States has a 
tremendous interest in the CBD’s encouragement of access to and development of 
biodiversity resources.  In its 1994 letter supporting ratification, pharmaceutical giant Merck 
reminded the Senate that “[p]lants, insects, microorganisms, and marine organisms have 
yielded some of the greatest pharmaceutical breakthroughs of this century,” and warned 
that “the loss of biodiversity could literally mean lost opportunities for researching the 
mechanisms of disease and discovering some important new medicines.”76  Since the early 
1990s, biotechnology has become integral to many other industries beyond medicine, 
including industrial products, toxic clean-up, and consumer goods, and there are thousands 
of businesses whose work concerns biotechnology.77     
In 2010, the CBD Parties adopted a protocol 
that addresses ABS in more detail.78  Among 
other provisions, the protocol requires countries 
that provide access to their biodiversity to adopt 
transparent, fair, and non-arbitrary procedures, 
thereby providing a reliable framework to facilitate 
entry by private sector enterprises bio-prospecting  
for new food supplies and pharmaceutical, medicinal, 
and biochemical resources.79  The Protocol’s 
clarification of the rules applying to access to genetic 
resources would greatly benefit U.S. companies, but 
participation in the Protocol is limited to the Parties 
to the CBD.
All of the concerns expressed in the mid-1990s about U.S. participation in the CBD 
have long since been disproved by the experience of other countries.  If the CBD really 
infringed on sovereign land-use decisions, imposed financial burdens, required the violation 
of intellectual property rights, and inhibited access to and development of biotechnology, 
then the many other countries in the world that have similar interests to the United States 
would not continue to participate in the convention.  That the membership of the CBD has 
grown to include virtually every country in the world, including all of the closest U.S. allies, 
demonstrates that the fears that have blocked U.S. ratification are unfounded.  
What Actions Should the United States Take?
In the end, one of the most powerful arguments for embracing both the conservation and 
the ABS objectives of the CBD was stated succinctly by Pulitzer Prize-winning biologist 
E.O. Wilson, “Useful products cannot be harvested from extinct species.”80  The Obama 
Administration should prioritize the CBD as a key treaty requiring immediate ratification.  
In turn, the Senate should act quickly to provide its consent. 
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V. London Dumping Convention, 1996 Protocol
1996 ProtoCol to the london Convention on Prevention of mArine 
Pollution by dumPing of WAstes And other mAtter 
Adopted by the Parties to the London Convention (including the United States) and 
Opened for Signature on November 7, 1996
Entered into Force on March 24, 2006 
Number of Parties: 41
Signed by the United States on March 31, 1998 
Sent to the Senate on September 4, 2007 
Reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
on July 29, 2008
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
For decades, nations have found a solution to ever-escalating waste volumes by dumping 
chemical wastes, incinerated debris, sewage sludge, municipal wastes, and wastes from  
ships in the oceans.  Until the early 1970s, ocean dumping of high-level radioactive waste 
was legal, and dumping of low-level radioactive waste continued well into the 1980s.   
In the United States, the most common material dumped at sea is wastes from harbor  
and river dredging,81 which may contain toxic sediments.  On a global scale, ocean dumping 
pollutes the commons, threatens coral reefs and other marine life, and can harm humans 
through contamination of seafood.  Pollution from ships accounts for 70 to 90 percent  
of all marine pollution.  
How Does the Protocol Address This Problem?
To address the problem of ocean dumping, the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter limited intentional dumping 
and incineration of waste at sea and the resulting damage to marine resources.  Nearly two 
and a half decades later, the United States and the other Parties to the London Convention 
agreed to a protocol that makes fundamental changes to the Convention, based on the 
widespread belief that the original 1972 Convention was not strict enough.    
Upon its entry into force in 2006, the 1996 Protocol replaced the earlier treaty entirely as 
between the Parties to the Protocol.  The Protocol increases global protections for the marine 
environment.  For example, whereas the original 1972 treaty limits incineration of waste at 
sea, the 1996 Protocol bans incineration at sea outright.82  The 1996 Protocol also ensures 
stricter regulation of marine dumping through its “reverse list.” Rather than preventing the 
dumping of specific listed substances, as the 1972 Convention does, the Protocol prohibits 
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its Parties from dumping any substance other than those specifically listed in Annex 1.83  
The 1996 Protocol also establishes a permit process for the legal dumping of Annex 1 
substances.84  The Protocol has sensible exceptions, including for emergency situations and 
force majeure, and it does not affect oil and gas drilling operations or scientific exploration.  
The 1996 Protocol reflects both a precautionary approach and the “polluter pays” principle.  
It requires those seeking ocean-dumping permits for legal substances to consider the potential 
effects of their dumping, alternative disposal methods, potential waste prevention strategies 
at the source, and dump site selection.85  
What Is the History and Status of the Protocol? 
The Protocol entered into force on March 24, 2006, upon ratification by the requisite 26 
nations.  The United States signed the Protocol on March 31, 1998, but has not yet ratified 
it.  The George W. Bush Administration strongly supported ratification.  David A. Balton, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, explained in a statement to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2008 that the United States “supported 
the updating and improvements of the Convention that the Protocol reflects.”86  He also 
stressed the importance of the United States’ maintaining a leadership role in preventing 
marine pollution and pointed out that, as a full participant in the Protocol, the United 
States would be able to influence which new substances are added to the list of prohibited 
substances, as well as help to develop other policies and procedures in the implementation  
of the Protocol.
In 2008, the Bush Administration submitted draft legislation to implement the Protocol 
through modifications to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (“MPRSA”).87 
The legislative changes needed to ratify the Protocol are quite minor.  For example, the 
MPRSA would need to explicitly prohibit incineration at sea and dumping of low-level 
radioactive waste, but these prohibitions have been followed in practice in the United States 
since the 1970s.  In fact, the Bush Administration concluded that “[t]here will not be any 
substantive changes to existing practices in the United States, and no economic impact is 
expected from implementation of the Protocol.”88
Why Should the United States Ratify the Protocol? 
The Protocol enjoys widespread support from key industry players.  For example, the 
American Association of Ports and Harbors and the Dredging Contractors of America 
participated in the negotiations and support the Protocol and its objectives (the Protocol does 
not ban disposal of dredged spoil).  One of the chief benefits to industry of U.S. ratification 
is that the Protocol establishes uniform international regulatory standards.89  As the 
International Maritime Organization has explained, the benefits of becoming a contracting 
Party to the 1996 Protocol include enhanced protection of a Party’s marine environment, 
access to technical assistance to aid marine environmental protection, and participation in 
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forums to address scientific issues related to ocean dumping and to settle disputes among 
Parties arising out of ocean dumping activities.
In July 2008, on a voice vote without objection, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
approved ratification of the Protocol, subject to a declaration that modified some disputed 
resolution and arbitration provisions but not the underlying substantive environmental 
objectives of the Protocol.90  In its report, the Committee stated that: 
The Protocol would serve to protect the U.S. marine environment more effectively 
from the harmful effects of wastes and other matter disposed of or incinerated at sea. 
Moreover, the international regime for addressing ocean dumping and the incineration 
of wastes and other matter at sea established by the Protocol is beginning to replace the 
framework established by the London Convention as more and more countries ratify the 
Protocol.  As a result, it is increasingly important that the United States be able to fully 
participate in the development and implementation of the Protocol in international fora, 
so that the United States is able to advance and protect key U.S. interests in the protec-
tion of the marine environment.91
The full Senate has not taken up the treaty, however, perhaps reflecting a reluctance to reopen 
the MPRSA, which has not been amended since 1988.
What Actions Should the United States 
Take?  
The Obama Administration and the Senate should 
move expeditiously to ratify the Protocol.  It is the 
most effective treaty ever drafted to protect the marine 
environment, including U.S. coastlines and fisheries, 
from the harmful effects of marine pollution.  Moreover, 
joining the Protocol will advance and safeguard key U.S. 
interests in the protection of the marine environment 
in the twenty-first century, such as participation in the 
drafting of rules that could govern carbon sequestration 
under the seabed.  The international regime for 
addressing ocean dumping embodied in the Protocol  
has now wholly replaced the 1972 London Convention.  
It makes little sense for the United States to continue  
to adhere to an obsolete treaty while other countries join 
the 1996 Protocol.
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VI. Plant Genetic Resources Treaty
internAtionAl treAty on PlAnt genetiC resourCes  
for food And AgriCulture 
Adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organization on November 3, 2001
Entered into Force on June 29, 2004 
Number of Parties: 127
Signed by the United States on November 3, 2002 
Sent to the Senate on July 7, 2008 
Reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
on December 14, 2010
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
As the world’s population continues to grow, global production of food must grow with it.  
In the words of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The development of sustainable, higher-yielding crop supplies is an integral part of 
ensuring global food security.  By 2050, the world’s population is estimated to reach 
9.1 billion, 34 percent higher than today.  The United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) predicts that farmers will have to increase production by at least 70 
percent by 2050 to satisfy the demand for food due to the world’s growing population, 
urbanization, and rising incomes.  Global agriculture has addressed challenges of growth 
on a similar scale in recent decades largely as a result of advances in plant genetics.92
To meet the demands for increased production, as well as to respond to the constant threats 
of loss from disease, pests, and drought, new crops must continually be developed.  The food 
security of the United States, as well as the world as a whole, depends in large part on the 
ability of researchers to continue to develop crops with new traits.93  Thus, plant researchers 
must have access to the genetic material of plants that may have resistance to these threats.  
Plant breeders and farmers rely on the genetic resources of plants as the raw material used to 
create new crop varieties.  These resources are viewed by many as the foundation for modern 
agriculture and as essential for achieving global food security.94  Because this material is found 
in many different countries, all countries effectively depend on access to the genetic banks of 
others.  For many years, the rules regulating this international access were unclear, making it 
more difficult for U.S. and foreign researchers to obtain plant genetic materials from banks in 
other countries.  
In particular, it has been difficult to resolve the tension between the desire to ensure that the 
raw genetic materials necessary for research and development remain in the public domain 
and the belief that, as a matter of fairness and to provide adequate incentives for such 
Page 26 Center for Progressive Reform
Reclaiming Global Environmental Leadership
research, it is necessary to recognize intellectual property rights in the worked (and, perhaps, 
even the raw) genetic material.95   
How Does the Treaty Address This Problem?
After years of negotiation under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the international community negotiated a treaty that comprehensively addresses 
these issues.  The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
requires each Party to take specified steps to protect its plant genetic resources and promote 
their sustainable use.96  It also encourages, but does not require, each Party to protect and 
promote the rights of farmers and indigenous communities, such as:  
•	 the protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture; 
•	 the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture; and 
•	 the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related 
to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture.97
Most importantly, the Treaty establishes a Multilateral System to facilitate access to plant 
genetic resources and share the benefits arising from their use.  The Multilateral System 
applies to the plant genetic resources of 64 listed food crops and forages, including wheat, 
corn, rice, barley, oats, potatoes, peas, apples, and citrus “that are under the management 
and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain.”98  The treaty provides that, 
with respect to those plant genetic resources, each Party must allow access to other Parties 
and to the legal and natural persons within those Parties’ jurisdiction.99  But the access is not 
unlimited.  It is provided only under certain conditions, including that: 
•	 the access is accorded only for research for food and agriculture, not for chemical, 
pharmaceutical, or other non-food purposes;
•	 recipients may not claim intellectual property rights that limit access to the plant 
genetic resources in the form received from the multilateral system; and 
•	 the access is provided through a standard “material transfer agreement,” as adopted by 
the governing body of the Treaty.100  
The Treaty also provides that if a recipient of plant genetic resources from the Multilateral 
System commercializes a product incorporating such material, the recipient shall pay “an 
equitable share of the benefits arising from the commercialization of that product” to a 
Trust Fund created by the Parties to the Treaty.101  The current royalty rate is 0.77 percent 
of gross sales, which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has noted is “consistent with 
existing practice with respect to current industry royalty rates.”102  According to the Treaty, 
benefits from the Trust Fund “should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in 
all countries, especially in developing countries, and countries with economies in transition, 
who conserve and sustainably utilize plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.”103
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What Is the History and Status of the Treaty? 
The Treaty has quickly attracted more than 125 Parties, including Canada, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom.  In the United States, the Treaty has received consistent bipartisan 
support.  It was negotiated initially by the Clinton Administration and was finalized, 
signed, and submitted to the Senate by the George W. Bush Administration.  The Obama 
Administration has urged the Senate to give its advice and consent.104  Ratification would 
require no changes in U.S. law.  The Executive Branch informed the Senate that it already 
has all the necessary authority to implement the Treaty and is seeking no new legislation.105  
Indeed, the United States has for many years freely distributed the information covered by 
the Treaty through the National Plant Germplasm System within the USDA Agricultural 
Research Service.106  
Why Should the United States Ratify the Treaty?
By establishing a firm legal basis for international access to plant genetic materials, the Treaty 
helps to ensure the continued development of food and agricultural resources on which 
the world’s population depends.  In addition to the general benefits accruing to the United 
States as well as other countries from promoting global food security, the establishment of “a 
stable, legal framework for international germplasm exchanges . . . benefits both research and 
commercial interests in the United States.”107  
Joining the Treaty would enable the United States to participate fully with the other Parties 
in its interpretation and implementation.  For example, the Parties have control over the 
terms of the standard material transfer agreement and the Trust Fund that receives and 
disburses payments from recipients of plant genetic resources from the Multilateral System.  
In particular, as a Party the United States would be able to veto changes to the list of plant 
genetic resources covered by the Multilateral System, which may be amended only by a 
consensus decision of the Parties, and to veto any efforts to increase royalty rates.   
The Treaty has received support from major U.S. stakeholders, including the American Seed 
Trade Association (ASTA), which has stated that “ASTA and many in agriculture believe it 
essential that the U.S. Government be fully engaged as a Party to the international treaty 
so that the issues of importance to the seed industry, and thus American agriculture, are 
effectively addressed.”  Other industry supporters include the National Farmers Union, the 
American Soybean Association, the National Association of Wheat Growers, the National 
Corn Growers Association, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and the Intellectual 
Property Owners of America.108    
What Actions Should the United States Take?
In short, there is no reason not to ratify the Plant Genetic Resources Treaty, and many good 
reasons to ratify it.  The Senate should give its advice and consent without delay.  
The Treaty 
helps to ensure 
the continued 
development 
of food and 
agricultural 
resources 
on which 
the world’s 
population 
depends.
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VII. Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions  
and the POPs Protocol to the LRTAP Convention
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
The movement of toxic substances around the world, whether intentionally through trade, 
or unintentionally as pollutants carried via wind or water, is a continuing environmental and 
health concern.  Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) are of particular international concern 
not only because they are toxic to humans and the environment, but also because they can 
persist in the environment for extremely long periods of time, travel long distances via the 
wind and water, and bioaccumulate in the food chain.  Many POPs are also believed to be 
endocrine disruptors in both humans and other species.  Many of what are referred to as the 
“dirty dozen” POPs are pesticides, such as DDT, which were used extensively and released 
into the environment in enormous quantities for decades after World War II, when industry 
was undergoing a technological boom and the green revolution in agriculture was beginning 
to take off.  POPs have been found virtually everywhere on earth, including thousands of 
miles away from any place they have been used, such as pristine areas of the Arctic.
The Conventions 
The Rotterdam Convention, the Stockholm Convention, and the POPs Protocol to the 
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution each address aspects of the 
international movement of toxic substances.  Each of these agreements has been signed by the 
United States, but the United States has not yet enacted legislation necessary to implement 
the three agreements.  Due to the parallels among these agreements, implementing legislation 
can be designed that would allow ratification of all three agreements.  A description of each 
agreement and its status is provided below.  A discussion of the necessary implementing 
legislation for ratification of all three agreements follows.
the rotterdAm Convention on the Prior informed Consent ProCedure  
for CertAin hAzArdous ChemiCAls And PestiCides in internAtionAl trAde 
Adopted and Opened for Signature on September 10, 1998
Entered into Force on February 24, 2004 
Number of Parties: 144
Signed by the United States on September 11, 1998 
Sent to the Senate on February 9, 2000
How Does the Rotterdam Convention Address the Problem? 
The Rotterdam Convention is a multilateral treaty that seeks to promote shared 
responsibilities regarding the importation of hazardous chemicals, including pesticides, and 
to promote the open exchange of information.  The Convention encourages exporters of 
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hazardous chemicals to use proper labeling, to include directions on safe handling, and to 
inform purchasers of any known restrictions or bans.  Parties to the Convention are free to 
make their own decisions whether to allow or ban the importation of chemicals listed in the 
treaty.  Exporting countries are required to ensure that producers within their jurisdiction 
comply with treaty requirements.  
One of the most significant features of the Rotterdam Convention is that it requires the 
implementation of a mandatory “prior informed consent” (PIC) procedure.109  The PIC 
process set out in the Rotterdam Convention requires exporters of chemicals that have 
been banned or severely restricted for health or environmental reasons in the exporting 
country to obtain the prior informed consent of an importing country before exporting 
to that country.  Chemicals subject to the PIC Procedure are listed in Annex III of the 
Convention.  Currently, Annex III includes 40 chemicals, 29 of which are pesticides, and 
recommendations for several other additional chemicals.  
Once a chemical is included in Annex III, a “decision guidance document” (DGD) 
containing information concerning the chemical and the regulatory decisions is circulated 
to all Parties.  Parties then have nine months to prepare a response concerning the future 
import of the chemical.  The response can consist of either a final decision (to allow import 
of the chemical, not to allow import, or to allow import subject to specified conditions) or 
an interim response.  Decisions by an importing country must be trade neutral (i.e., apply 
equally to domestic production for domestic use as well as to imports from any source).  The 
PIC Secretariat circulates the import decisions to all Parties.
The Rotterdam Convention requires a Party to take appropriate measures to ensure that an 
exporter within its jurisdiction complies with the import decision for a chemical or pesticide 
listed in Annex III.  However, the mere inclusion of a substance in Annex III does not 
amount to a global ban on it.  Instead, the PIC provisions allow an importing Party to make 
an informed decision about whether or not to import a substance that has been listed as 
banned or severely restricted by the Convention.  
In addition to the PIC Procedure, the Convention also includes a number of requirements 
related to exports of chemicals.  A Party that plans to export a chemical that is banned or 
severely restricted for use within its territory is required to inform the importing Party that 
such export will take place, before the first shipment and annually thereafter.  In addition, 
when exporting chemicals that are to be used for occupational purposes, the exporting Party 
must ensure that an up-to-date safety data sheet is provided to the importer.
What Is the History and Status of the Convention?
The Rotterdam Convention was adopted on September 10, 1998, and President Bill 
Clinton signed the Convention the next day.  The Convention entered into force on 
February 24, 2004, after 50 countries had ratified it.  There are now more than 140 Parties 
to the Convention.  To date, the United States is a signatory to the Convention, but not 
a Party.  For the United States to become a Party, the Convention must receive advice and 
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consent from the Senate and implementing legislation must be passed.  As described in 
more detail below, implementing legislation is needed because existing U.S. statutes on the 
export of pesticides and other hazardous substances do not comply with the mandatory PIC 
procedures in the Convention.   
the stoCkholm Convention on Persistent orgAniC PollutAnts 
Opened for signature, May 22, 2001
Entered into Force on May 17, 2004 
Number of Parties: 176
Signed by the United States, May 23, 2001 
Sent to the Senate on May 6, 2002
How Does the Stockholm Convention Address the Problem? 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is a multilateral environmental 
treaty that aims to eliminate or restrict the production and use of certain POPs.  Pursuant 
to the terms of the Treaty, Parties agree to reduce or eliminate the production, use, and/
or release of specified POPs.  The Convention targets pesticides, industrial chemicals, and 
unintentionally produced POPs.  The 12 substances that were the initial focus, which are 
commonly referred to as the “dirty dozen,” include the pesticides aldrin, chlordane, DDT, 
deldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, mirex, and toxaphene and the nonpesticidal 
PCBs, dioxins, and furans.  The Convention establishes a scientific review process to add 
other POPs of global concern to the list of 21 covered substances. 
The goal of the Stockholm Convention is to phase out or, at a minimum, reduce the 
production, use, and release into the environment of the listed POPs.  Stockpiles of wastes 
containing POPs must be managed in a safe, efficient, and environmentally sound manner, 
taking into account international rules, standards, and guidelines. Parties are required 
to submit National Implementation Plans (NIPs) within two years after joining the 
Convention.  The Convention also establishes a system to provide technical and financial 
assistance to developing countries to help them to meet their obligations under  
the agreement.  
What Is the History and Status of the Convention? 
The Stockholm Convention was adopted on May 22, 2001, and President George W. Bush 
signed it the next day.  The Convention entered into force on May 17, 2004, after the fiftieth 
Party ratified it.  Currently, there are more than 170 Parties to the Convention.  For the 
United States to become a party to the Convention, the Senate must provide its advice and 
consent and implementing legislation must be passed.  As described below, implementing 
legislation is needed because U.S. statutes that address POPs use a regulatory standard that 
is less stringent than the standard in the Stockholm Convention.  They also do not include 
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a mechanism to trigger regulatory action when new substances are added to the list of POPs 
identified for elimination or reduction.
the ProtoCol to the 1979 Convention on long rAnge trAnsboundAry 
Air Pollution on Persistent orgAniC PollutAnts (lrtAP PoPs ProtoCol)  
Adopted and Opened for Signature on June 24, 1998
Entered into Force on October 23, 2003 
Number of Parties: 31
Signed by the United States on June 24, 1998
How Does the Protocol Address the Problem? 
The Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (or POPs) is one of eight protocols to the 
1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, or LRTAP.  The LRTAP 
Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE), a regional organization that includes the United States and Canada 
as well as European countries.  The POPs Protocol requires Parties to take certain steps to 
eliminate the production and use of certain POPs in the UNECE region.  The Protocol 
initially applied to the 12 POPs originally listed in the Stockholm Convention.  Four 
additional chemicals have since been added.  Parties must ensure that the listed POPs are 
destroyed and disposed of in an environmentally sound manner, preferably domestically 
rather than by export.  The Protocol also requires Parties to ensure that any transboundary 
movement of listed POPs takes place in an environmentally sound manner.  The Protocol 
also requires the Parties to restrict the uses of certain other POPs and to reduce the annual 
emissions of yet others.  
What Is the History and Status of the Protocol?
The LRTAP Convention was adopted in 1979, went into effect in 1983, and currently has 
51 Parties, including the United States.  President Bill Clinton signed the POPs Protocol 
to LRTAP on June 24, 1998.  The Protocol entered into force on October 23, 2003, and 
currently has 31 Parties.  The Executive Branch has taken the position that because the 
United States is a Party to LRTAP, Senate advice and consent is not necessary for ratification.  
Instead, the Protocol can be entered into as an executive agreement.  Nevertheless, legislative 
amendments are necessary to implement the Protocol.  
Why Should the United States Ratify these Agreements?
Ratification of these three agreements has extensive support from industry, NGOs, and 
numerous foreign governments.   The American Chemistry Council believes that they 
“establish a harmonized approach for action on listed chemicals, and should produce 
meaningful improvements in public health and environmental protection.”  The Council  
has stated that “the United States must become a Party to the agreements as soon as 
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possible.”110  The leaders of approximately 30 U.S. NGOs explained in a letter to Congress  
in support of the Stockholm Convention’s ratification that the United States loses its ability 
to shape the success of the Convention and damages its reputation as an international  
leader in the global management of toxic POPs by remaining outside the agreement.111   
The majority of countries in the world have ratified the Rotterdam and Stockholm 
agreements, including most trading partners of the United States in the Pacific, Asia,  
Africa, Latin America, and Europe.  
U.S. interests will not be compromised by ratification of the agreements.  Decisions regarding 
the addition of chemicals to the Stockholm Convention, for example, must be based on 
science and must include a careful examination of all aspects of the chemical, including the 
consequences of prohibiting its use.  In addition, the prohibition of the chemical has to be 
adopted by a three-quarters majority of the Convention.  Even then, the United States retains 
the ability to opt out of any listing.  Moreover, the United States could take the position that 
it will opt out of any listing unless it decides to opt in at the U.S. government’s discretion.112  
While the United States may have issues with the potential addition of certain chemicals 
to the Stockholm Convention, it cannot significantly influence whether these chemicals 
are added without becoming a full participant through congressional ratification of the 
agreement.113  Ratifying the Convention would give the United States and the EPA the 
authority needed to effectively negotiate with other countries regarding the elimination or 
reduction of POPs.  More importantly, it would give the United States the ability to pressure 
other Parties to the Convention to more intensely regulate chemicals that threaten the health 
of Americans.114
For the United States to be able to ratify these three international agreements, Congress will 
have to amend the U.S. statutes that regulate pesticides and toxic substances.   
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
The principal U.S. statute regulating pesticides is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  FIFRA requires an upfront evaluation of pesticides before they 
can enter the U.S. market, and imported pesticides must meet the same requirements as 
domestically produced pesticides:  to obtain a FIFRA registration, an applicant must show 
that the pesticides do not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.  This 
standard has been interpreted as a cost-benefit balancing standard.  
In contrast, pesticides exported from the United States to other countries do not require an 
EPA approval and are subject only to very limited regulation under FIFRA.  FIFRA does not 
provide EPA with the authority to require exporters to obtain the prior informed consent 
of importing countries in either situation where the pesticide has not been approved for 
use in the United States or in situations where the EPA has banned a pesticide because it 
poses an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment.  For example, pesticides that are 
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not registered for use in the United States may be manufactured here and exported abroad 
as long as “the foreign purchaser has signed a statement acknowledging that the purchaser 
understands that such pesticide is not registered for use in the United States.”115  Pesticides 
with cancelled or suspended registrations—for example, EPA has determined that they pose 
an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment—may still be exported to other countries 
as long as EPA provides a one-time notification of its decision to foreign governments and 
international agencies.116  In other words, FIFRA does not provide the authority to satisfy the 
Rotterdam Convention’s PIC process.  
The primary federal statute that applies to non-
pesticidal, non-drug substances in the United States 
is the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).  Unlike 
FIFRA, TSCA does not require that chemicals obtain 
a registration or demonstrate compliance with any 
environmental or health standards prior to being 
sold, distributed, or used.  TSCA does not prohibit 
or restrict export of any substance, regardless of any 
U.S. regulatory action on that substance, provided that 
minimal labeling requirements are met.
Changes to FIFRA and TSCA
To comport with the Rotterdam Convention, Congress would need to amend FIFRA  
and TSCA to authorize EPA (or another government entity) to comply with the 
Convention’s PIC procedure.  Specifically, for chemicals that the United States bans or 
severely restricts, U.S. law would need to mandate that PIC from the importing country 
be obtained and would need to prohibit export to countries that have determined not to 
allow import of those substances.  As described above, existing U.S. law merely requires 
information on banned chemicals to be provided to other countries but does not authorize 
the United States to prohibit export of these substances or require that PIC be obtained  
from importing countries.
Efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency
Although the United States has not yet ratified the Rotterdam Convention, EPA has stated 
that it is placing the highest priority on timely notification of exports of two categories 
of pesticides that EPA believes may be of the greatest concern to other countries:  (1) 
substances listed under Rotterdam, most of which the United States has also banned or 
severely restricted; and (2) substances not on the list that are nevertheless banned or severely 
restricted by the United States.  EPA has also declared its intention to try to make the U.S. 
export notification program compatible with the international one, while meeting domestic 
legislative requirements.117  However, without legislative modifications, it is not clear that 
EPA has the authority to fully comply with the Rotterdam Convention.
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Amendments to Restrict the POPs  
It will also be necessary to amend FIFRA and TSCA in order to fully implement the 
Stockholm Convention and the POPs Protocol to LRTAP.  Indeed, when President George 
W. Bush signed the Stockholm Convention, he noted that legislative changes would be 
necessary to authorize the United States to fully implement its obligations under the 
Convention.  Although President Bush called for “speedy” ratification of the Convention, the 
legislative changes necessary for ratification have not been made.
The United States has already taken regulatory action to ban or severely restrict the original 
dirty dozen POPs.  EPA has cancelled the FIFRA registrations for all of the pesticides on the 
dirty dozen list and thus none of these pesticides can be sold or distributed in the United 
States.  Moreover, in 1978 Congress imposed significant restrictions on the existing stocks of 
PCBs and prohibited future manufacture of these substances.  EPA has also taken regulatory 
action to reduce environmental releases of dioxins and furans by more than 85 percent.  
However, U.S. law currently does not have a process to address chemicals added to the 
Stockholm or LRTAP POPs lists.  As described above, the Stockholm Convention and the 
POPs Protocol to the LRTAP Convention set forth specific procedures that allow the Parties 
to add chemicals to the lists of POPs that should be reduced or eliminated.  To comply with 
these agreements, U.S. law must require decisions to be made as chemicals are added to the 
list.  Specifically, legislation should require EPA to take action when a chemical is added 
to the list.  Such a provision should not bind the United States by requiring that it ban 
chemicals added to the list, but rather should require EPA to take action to determine the 
appropriate regulatory action for the chemical.  
Amendment to Implement a Health-Based Standard
Another legislative change necessary to implement the Stockholm Convention  
is to amend FIFRA and TSCA to replace the existing cost-benefit balancing standard  
of FIFRA and “unreasonable risk” standard of TSCA with the “health-based” standard  
of the Convention for POPs chemicals.  The legislative changes needed to implement  
the POPs Protocol to the LRTAP Convention are very similar to those necessary  
to implement the Stockholm Convention.
Between 2002 and 2006, Congress considered a number of proposals that would have 
provided the implementing legislation necessary to ratify the three international agreements.  
In 2003, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee unanimously approved a 
bill that would amend TSCA, and in February 2004, the George W. Bush Administration 
developed a draft bill that would amend FIFRA.  This bill came under fire from 
environmental and health experts and was ultimately rejected by Democrats.  Subsequently, a 
series of bills were introduced which would not only amend FIFRA and TSCA to implement 
the Stockholm Convention, but would also implement the Rotterdam Convention and the 
POPs Protocol to the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention.  None of these 
bills were enacted.
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The Safe Chemicals Act of 2011
More recently, members of Congress have shown a renewed interest in enacting the 
legislation necessary to implement Rotterdam, Stockholm, and the POPs Protocol.  On 
April 14, 2011, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D.-N.J) introduced the “Safe Chemicals Act of 
2011” (S. 847).  The bill explicitly states that it provides the necessary legislative changes to 
permit the United States to ratify the three agreements.  In fact, the bill expressly states that 
“no person may manufacture, process, distribute in commerce, use, dispose of, or take any 
other action with respect to a POPs chemical, LRTAP POPs chemical, or PIC chemical in 
a manner inconsistent with applicable obligations for that chemical under the Stockholm 
Convention, LRTAP POPs Protocol, or Rotterdam Convention.”  If enacted, the bill would 
eliminate the current exemptions for substances produced in the United States but intended 
only for export.  The bill would reject the cost-benefit balancing standard of FIFRA and 
TSCA in favor of a “health-based” standard.  It would also authorize EPA to prohibit the 
production, use, import, or export of the POPs on the Stockholm Convention list, and 
would provide a public notice and comment process for chemicals proposed to be added to 
the list in the future.  In November 2011, the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.
What Actions Should the United States Take?
Enacting the Safe Chemicals Act and ratifying these three treaties is necessary to restore 
U.S. leadership in global efforts to protect human health and the environment.  Moreover, 
ratifying the treaties is in the specific interest of the United States, since an effective 
international regime governing toxic chemicals will reduce the exposure of U.S. nationals 
to these highly dangerous substances.118  Here, as with the other treaties described in this 
report, the United States needs a seat at the table in order to influence the future of the global 
chemicals regime.119  In particular, the United States cannot influence which chemicals are 
added to the PIC and POPs lists as long as it remains an observer rather than a full Party.  
Despite the apparent widespread support in the United States for the three agreements, 
ratification is far from certain.  Industry groups may support ratification in theory,  
but may be dissatisfied with the legislative changes needed to comply with the Treaties.   
For example, while industry groups may favor the United States becoming a voting Party  
to be able to exert influence over which chemicals are added to the PIC and POPs lists,  
they may not be as supportive to implementing legislation that replaces FIFRA’s or TSCA’s 
cost/benefit balancing standard with the Stockholm Convention’s more stringent health-
based standard.  The Safe Chemicals Act of 2011, which would provide the legislative 
changes needed for ratification of all three agreements, contains broader regulatory reforms 
that may not be viewed favorably by certain industry groups or Republicans that seek less 
government regulation.
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VIII. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
united nAtions Convention on the lAW of the seA (unClos) And 
Agreement relAting to the imPlementAtion of PArt xi of the Convention  
Adopted and Opened for Signature on December 10, 1982 
Agreement on Part XI Adopted on July 28, 1994
Entered into Force on November 16, 1994 (UNCLOS)  
and July 28, 1996 (Part XI) 
Number of Parties: 162 (UNCLOS) and 141 (Part XI)
Signed by the United States on July 29, 1994 
Sent to the Senate on October 7, 1994 
Reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
on February 25, 2004, and October 31, 2007
What Is the Environmental Problem? 
The world’s oceans cover roughly 70 percent of the planet and contain a variety of natural 
resources vital to nearly every nation.  Historically, individual countries had jurisdiction over 
a narrow strip of water adjacent to their coastlines.  The remainder was considered “the high 
seas,” the paradigmatic global commons that was free and open to all while belonging  
to no one.  As new technologies made it possible to reach farther and deeper into the ocean 
to catch fish and to extract other underwater resources, and as pollution of the oceans 
increased, countries had a clear impetus to establish a legal framework to govern activities  
in the high seas.  
How Does the Convention Address This Problem?
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) establishes 
a comprehensive framework for the world’s oceans.  It has become the bedrock legal 
instrument governing a wide array of ocean issues ranging from navigation to fishing to 
environmental protection to mining.  The Convention is one of the most important treaties 
in the history of international relations, addressing almost every aspect of the law of the 
sea.  Its provisions on environmental protection make up only one part of the Convention, 
but even by themselves they would constitute a critically important environmental treaty.  
They require states to take steps against a variety of threats to the marine environment, 
including pollution from vessels, dumping of waste, and over-fishing, and they set out rules 
of jurisdiction that clarify where and how states may enforce domestic and international 
environmental standards.  
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What Is the History and Status of the Convention? 
Although the United States took the lead in negotiating the LOS Convention, disagreement 
with one portion of the Convention (Part XI, addressing deep seabed mining) prevented 
the United States from ratifying the Convention.  Nevertheless, in 1983, President Ronald 
Reagan announced that the United States would abide by most of the provisions of the 
Convention, treating them as customary international law.120   In 1994, the United Nations 
completed negotiation of an additional agreement governing deep seabed mining.121  The 
new agreement, drafted with significant U.S. involvement, allayed the concerns that had 
prevented the United States and other developed nations from joining the LOS Convention.  
As a result, President Bill Clinton signed the LOS Convention and, together with the 
additional agreement, submitted it to the Senate in 1994.  
The Convention has received strong bipartisan support ever since.  President George W. 
Bush declared that joining the Convention would serve U.S. national interests ranging 
from security to environmental protection, and urged the Senate to approve it “as a matter 
of national security, economic self-interest, and international leadership.”122  During his 
Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee twice recommended Senate 
approval by overwhelming bipartisan majorities (by a 17-3 vote in 2004, and unanimously 
in 2007).  In a 2010 executive order, President Barack Obama similarly committed his 
administration to pursuing U.S. ratification of the Convention.123  Nevertheless, the 
Convention has never come up for a vote before the full Senate. 
Today, the Convention is one of the most widely ratified treaties in the world, with more 
than 160 Parties.  For the most part, non-Parties are developing countries that have no 
maritime interests.  The United States is the only developed coastal state, the only large 
economy, and the only naval power that does not belong to the Convention.
Why Should the United States Ratify the Convention?
Because joining the Convention would protect and advance a wide array of U.S. security, 
economic and environmental interests, it has the broadest range of support of any of the 
treaties covered in this report.  The nation’s security leadership, including the Navy and 
the Coast Guard, has unequivocally supported ratification of the Convention under both 
Republican and Democratic administrations.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged 
the Senate to approve the Convention,124 as have ocean policy experts,125 the oil and gas 
industry, and environmental groups.126  All emphasize the importance of ensuring that the 
United States has a seat at the table when the Convention Parties make crucial decisions 
affecting U.S. national interests.   
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Ratifying the LOS Convention would require no changes to U.S. law.  Indeed, the United 
States already considers itself bound by the Convention’s substantive provisions.127  By 
failing to ratify the convention, the United States diminishes its influence in global ocean 
governance and loses the opportunity to influence the direction of the law.  As the world’s 
largest maritime power, the United States has the most at stake from developments in the 
law of the sea.  Yet it continues to sit on the sidelines, thereby forfeiting the opportunity 
to participate in the governance of virtually every major ocean interest, including: freedom 
of navigation; marine environmental protection; natural resource management; oil, gas 
and mineral extraction; marine scientific research; and the peaceful resolution of ocean-
related disputes.  Failure to join the Convention not only prevents the United States from 
participating in the future development of international law on these points, but it also 
directly jeopardizes many significant U.S. interests. 
First and foremost, global freedom of navigation is essential for the exercise of U.S. military 
power.  By failing to join the Convention, the United States compromises its ability to assert 
navigational rights and freedoms essential to our armed forces.  As a non-Party and yet  
the world’s greatest maritime power, the United States is in a far weaker position than 
it should be.  The many examples include the right of innocent passage through other 
countries’ territorial waters and the authority of warships to board stateless vessels on the 
high seas, both of which are critically important for U.S. maritime security and for the 
success of ongoing operations to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as drug interdiction activities. Rather than being able to claim these rights as mutual 
commitments, the United States is forced to rely on the assertion that they have become 
customary international law and must therefore be extended to non-Parties.  The United 
States has thus placed itself in the weaker position of depending on the forbearance of the 
Convention’s Parties.  
Second, the United States has an enormous stake in the health of the world’s oceans and the 
living resources they contain.  The LOS Convention delimits state obligations to manage 
these resources sustainably.  Indeed, the United States has already ratified the addendum to 
the LOS Convention, which addresses both highly migratory fish stocks that cross national 
boundaries and the high seas, such as tuna, and straddling stocks that move between the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of more than one country.128  There are a host 
of other vital U.S. economic and environmental interests at stake in how the sea’s living 
resources are managed and marine pollution is regulated.  Were the United States a Party to 
the LOS Convention, it would be in a stronger position to advocate for effective protection 
of the world’s oceans.  By failing to ratify the Convention, the United States continues to 
sacrifice its leadership role in global ocean affairs. 
Failure to join 
the Convention 
directly 
jeopardizes 
many 
significant  
U.S. interests.
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Third, the Convention sets the rules for further 
territorial claims over marine resources.  For 
example, it authorizes states to assert claims over the 
continental shelf beyond their 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone.129  As recent Russian expeditions to 
the Arctic have shown, other states are vigorously 
pursuing claims to the resource-rich extended 
continental shelf.  The international commission 
created by the Convention to review such claims 
has already received nine submissions from other 
states, and has made recommendations on two.  As 
a non-Party, the United States cannot assert its own 
claim.  Were the United States a Party, it could 
also participate in appointing the commissioners130 
and a U.S. national would likely be included on 
this influential body that will undoubtedly impact 
the future outer limits of the U.S. shelf.  As a non-Party, the United States can only try to 
influence these critical decisions from the sidelines.  As a result, it is entirely possible, even 
likely, that overlapping claims made by other States will be resolved contrary to the United 
States’ interests.
What Actions Should the United States Take?
For all of these reasons, the Senate should act quickly to provide its advice and consent.  
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